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Abstract
The aim of this research is to identify whether there is a need for greater public awareness of
security related to Bluetooth. This study surveyed public opinion in different aspects of
Bluetooth's security. An analysis of the data found that females were generally more vigilant
than males when using Bluetooth and that those who have some knowledge in Bluetooth
security are generally more security conscious. The outcome revealed a need for the public to
become familiar with the threats of impersonation, random attacks and targeted attacks, as
well as the security measures available to avoid these. It also revealed that the public have
overestimated the threat of contracting viruses and malware when using Bluetooth. The
majority have not realized the degree of how widely used Bluetooth is.
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1. Introduction
Technology has evolved rapidly in the past decade, with new devices being pushed into the
market sooner and more frequently with each passing year. Not only are these innovations
rolling off the assembly lines faster, the devices themselves are getting smaller, lighter and
more compact while at the same time their functions and the number of features are ever
expanding. Take for example the cellular phone: twenty years ago only the wealthy would
have the luxury of holding one that resembled a brick with an antenna, whereas today almost
everyone including young children carries one in their pockets. These new devices are feature
rich and can not only be used to call others, but also to send text messages, take pictures with
the built-in cameras, play music, download ringtones from the internet, store contact details
such as phone numbers, email addresses and birthdays, play games with others and act as a
personal organizer. In the information security field it is common knowledge that generally
increased convenience comes at the trade-off of security. However, this knowledge does not
appear to be common for the public, as the public are preoccupied with convenience in order
to maximize time efficiency. This is evidenced by the advent of convenience stores such as
Star Mart and Seven Eleven and the increase of one-stop megastores such as K-Mart and
Farmers. This includes the boom of e-commerce that allow the consumer to do their shopping
without taking the time to travel to a shop and look for the items they want. This imbalance
with regard to security versus the desire for convenience is concerning as there are more
innocent members of the public that become the victims of fraud or identity theft as a result
of the compromise of their personal information. One such area of information technology
that is increasingly popular worldwide that has yet to have many reviews of its security is
Bluetooth; the wireless information transfer protocol that is now commonly built into cellular
phones and laptops.
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Bluetooth is a short-range wireless cable-replacement technology that is commonly used in
voice and data applications. It is superior to the now-outdated infrared technology as it is able
to penetrate solid objects and broadcast omni-directionally without the need for two devices
to be within the line of sight of each other (Bluetooth SIG, 2008; Kitsos, Sklavos,
Papadomanolakis, & Koufopavlou, 2003). The roots of Bluetooth can be traced back to
1994, where it was founded by Ericsson (Baker, 2005). However it was not until 1998 when
the Bluetooth Special Interest Group (SIG) was formed via a coalition between Ericsson,
Nokia, Intel, IBM, and Toshiba that the Bluetooth standards were initially defined (Baker,
2005; Becker, 2007; Haartsen, 2000; Vainio, 2000). Today, more than 9,000 companies are
members of the Bluetooth SIG, including big players of the market such as Microsoft and
Motorola (Bluetooth SIG, 2008; Hager & Midkiff, 2003b; Sun, Howie, Koivisto, & Sauvola,
2001).
The strengths of using Bluetooth, especially in the face of a world with Wi-Fi, lies in its ease
of setting up a connection with other devices, coupled with its low cost (Bluetooth chips cost
less than US$3), high speed performance and low power consumption (Bluetooth SIG, 2008;
Haartsen, 2000; Hager & Midkiff, 2003a, 2003b; Insight Consulting, 2006; Kitsos et al.,
2003; Sun et al., 2001)1. This makes it a more practical choice for use in Personal Area
Networks (PANS), while Wi-Fi is used for Local Area Networks (LANs) (Xydis & BlakeWilson, 2002).
The motivation behind this research lies in exploring the imbalance in the importance placed
on security compared with other aspects of the typical information system. Security is
commonly ignored or given a lower priority than the other features. Security is commonly
added onto a system after its implementation rather than as a crucial component during the
planning stage. The number of headlines in the media highlighting the extent of losses and
embarrassment that could have been prevented by properly implemented information security
serves to enforce the idea that security should not be taken lightly.
Bluetooth has become a technology that most people have access to, being built into most
cellular phones and laptops. This widespread popularity of Bluetooth signifies a need for
stringent security during the transfer of data. This is more so the case since Bluetooth is here
to stay, despite the more popular Wi-Fi as an alternative wireless communications protocol,
due to Bluetooth costing up to one third the amount of Wi-Fi to implement and using up to
one fifth the power (Bluetooth SIG, 2008). The subject of this research was targeted on the
issue of how the public view the security of Bluetooth rather than assessing and evaluating
the strengths and weaknesses of Bluetooth security. Bluetooth's official website (Bluetooth
SIG, 2008) has several research papers and white papers' detailing its strengths, while many
independent studies have been carried out with regards to identifying the weaknesses and
vulnerabilities.
This paper will examine the schematics behind Bluetooth, followed by a detailed analysis of
the public perception of the security of Bluetooth based on the data collected through a
survey. The reliability of the received data will be then presented together with conclusions
and plans for the future research.

2. Public perceptions of Bluetooth security
With the explosive growth in the marketing of Bluetooth devices worldwide, it would be
logical to see that public awareness of the security risks of using Bluetooth would grow
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accordingly. In order to examine how the public generally perceive the security of Bluetooth,
it was necessary to collect relevant data from the public, and to subsequently analyze them
statistically to make meaningful interpretations of the public's opinions.
A survey was produced to obtain the publics’ opinion regarding the different categories of
threats that Bluetooth are vulnerable to. The categories were selected following a brief review
of the literature and the questions were formulated with minimal technical jargon in order to
facilitate easier understanding. The survey was applied to a sample of the public, which
consisted mainly of undergraduate and postgraduate students from The University of
Auckland Business School.
Although this may limit the generality of the results, new technologies are generally learned
more quickly and are used more frequently by younger users (Czaja, Hammond, Blascovich,
& Swede, 1989; Czaja & Sharit, 1993; Kang & Yoon, 2008; Mead, Spaulding, Sit, Meyer, &
Walker, 1997), and therefore selecting students for the sample is appropriate for this study.
The survey asked two groups of questions, most of which were measured on a Likert’s scale.
Each question had a separate scale and hence not every question had the same number of
items. The first group of questions asked personal characteristics about the respondent, such
as their gender, their Bluetooth usage habits (5 items), whether they have studied computer
security in general or not, and (a) whether they have studied Bluetooth security at all. These
will be used to group the respondents. The second group of questions asked for the
respondent's opinion with regards to the different categories of Bluetooth threats such as its
susceptibility to malware (5 items), the integrity of the data being transmitted wirelessly from
one device to another (5 items), the resilience of Bluetooth devices to both random attacks (5
items) and targeted attacks (5 items), the impact of the loss from a Bluetooth attack (3 items),
the susceptibility of Bluetooth devices to impersonation attacks (5 items), whether security is
a concern to them when using Bluetooth, and their opinion on whether there was a need to
strengthen Bluetooth's security. Refer to Appendix A for the survey that was administered to
the respondents.
A total of 48 surveys were handed out and returned, and the results were coded and entered
into a spreadsheet application in preparation for analysis.
For the analysis of the data, the spreadsheet was imported into SPSS to perform ANOVA
tests. The tests that were performed included seeing the distribution of answers for each
question, then testing for differences in the answers between males and females, testing for
differences in the answers between more frequent users to less frequent users, and the
difference in answers between people who have studied computer security against those who
have not. The analysis is presented next.

3. Exploratory Analysis
Detailed results and discussion are included in Wong, (2008). Here we shall present the
summary of the discussion. Refer to Appendix A for percentage values.
An initial exploratory analysis shows that about half of the respondents claim to have studied
computer security and slightly less than half of the respondents claim to have studied
Bluetooth security. Although such results should be expected since many of the respondents
are information systems students, the high interest in Bluetooth security were surprising as
3

the University of Auckland does not specifically teach Bluetooth security in any stage 3 or
postgraduate courses on information security. It is possible that some respondents believed
that general security concepts taught in the stage 1 information systems course, which is
compulsory for all students undertaking the Bachelor of Commerce, could be extrapolated to
include this technology. This was not the original intention of the question, and may be a
result of misinterpretation due to insufficient clarity in the question.
The results of the distribution of respondents that are concerned about security when using
Bluetooth further supports this as less than half of the respondents are concerned about how
safe their data and their device when using Bluetooth.
Interestingly, a large majority of respondents felt that Bluetooth security should be
strengthened despite a large proportion of them not being concerned about it when using
Bluetooth. Perhaps media reports of security breaches can be attributed to this; yet these
respondents do not believe that the use of Bluetooth faces the same risks as use of the
internet.
Gender is roughly balanced between male and female respondents, while Bluetooth usage is
heavily skewed revealing that the research respondents mostly use Bluetooth fewer than 3
times per month. When asked personally, many respondents replied that they use Bluetooth
on an ad hoc basis which occurs very infrequently, perhaps even less than once per month on
average. This low usage of Bluetooth is understandable given New Zealand's low population
density. This is in contrast to countries with high population density such as Hong Kong, as
one respondent stated that some people in Hong Kong never turn off the Bluetooth function
on their cell phones as free downloads are broadcasted via Bluetooth by some organizations
in certain areas, offering free screensavers, wallpapers and music. However the same
respondent goes on to say that their phone was infected by a virus on one occasion via such
means.
The confidence of respondents in Bluetooth's resistance to malicious software such as worms
and viruses is skewed, suggesting that many respondents (around 45%) feel that Bluetooth
devices are susceptible to viruses. However, a closer examination of the distribution graph
shows that half the respondents were neutral about it, which may indicate a lack of
knowledge about the subject matter to give an informed answer. The same applies to the
confidence that the data being wirelessly transmitted from Bluetooth device to Bluetooth
device is not intercepted by a third party or tampered with. Around 50% answers were neutral
on this question.
The confidence in the resistance of Bluetooth devices to random attacks are spread quite
evenly across 'not likely', 'neutral' and 'likely' , with fewer neutral responses, and leaning
more towards the unconfident (likely to succumb to an attack) side. For confidence in the
resistance of Bluetooth devices against targeted attacks, most respondents generally believe
that it would be easy for an attacker to successfully tamper with a Bluetooth device
externally.
There is an evenly balanced distribution of responses for the confidence in the sender's
identity not being an impersonator. The general consensus of the impact of a Bluetooth attack
seems to range from minor to moderate with very few respondents believing such an attack
could cause a major loss either monetarily or time-wise.
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A majority of respondents knew that most phones have Bluetooth capabilities;
capabilities which is not
surprising given the prevalence of cellphones.
cellphones Many respondents also knew that laptops and
PCs have a Bluetooth function,
nction, although there were fewer responses than expected. Few
responses were given for other devices that may contain Bluetooth. Detailed results are
presented in Fig 1:

Fig 1: Distribution of the proportion of respondents’ knowledge of Bluetooth devices
devi
This exploratory analysis provides a general idea of the views of the public regarding each
aspect of Bluetooth security. We now assess if the effects of any subgroups within the
population have an effect on the responses that were provided.

4. Statistical analysis of the results
To ascertain whether certain characteristics affect the views that the public hold regarding
Bluetooth security, ANOVA tests are performed to test for differences between genders, the
different groups of usage level of Bluetooth,
Bluetooth, and the different groups of knowledge of
security.
Test 1 - Gender
An initial ANOVA run was performed to see which question varied significantly between
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males and females. It was found that the confidence in the resistance against random attacks,
the confidence of the sender's identity, and the Bluetooth usage per month had significant
differences. All other variables showed no significant differences between gender.
Before proceeding to testing the difference in responses between males and females, it must
firstly be ascertained whether the statistical assumptions have been met.
The first assumption of independence between observations requires that each observation
must not have any dependence on the responses of any other observation. As each respondent
was approached individually to fill out the survey and were specifically asked to answer it
alone without external assistance, this assumption has been satisfied.
The second assumption of homoscedasticity tests for the equality of variance across groups to
see whether there is a significant difference in the spread of the data between each group.
This is tested for via the Levene test statistic, where a significant p-value indicates that there
is a significant difference between groups which violates this assumption. Therefore a nonsignificant p-value is desired. For the confidence in the resistance to random attacks, the
Levene test significance level of 0.958 presents no evidence against the hypothesis of equal
variances, as does the test statistic of 0.450 for the confidence in the sender's identity.
However, the Levene test significance level of 0.001 for the uses of Bluetooth per month
provides very strong evidence against the hypothesis of equal variances between males and
females in using Bluetooth. Due to the nature of the variables being categorical,
transformations cannot be applied to fix this issue.
The third assumption of normality tests that the observations follow a normal distribution.
This is tested via the Shapiro-Wilk statistic, where a significant p-value indicates that the data
does not follow the normal bell-shaped curve. Therefore, like with the Levene test statistic, a
non-significant p-value is desired. For all three variables there were significant results
indicating violations of the normality assumption. However with a sample size of 48, we can
assume normality via the Central Limit Theorem.
Therefore, at the close of the assumptions testing, it is concluded that the Bluetooth uses per
month does not conform to the homoscedasticity assumption and thus should not be used for
further analysis. Confidence in the resistance to random attacks and the confidence in the
sender's identity both satisfy all the assumptions and will thus proceed to the next stage of
analysis.
The ANOVA tests indicate that there is very strong evidence that there is a significant
difference in the opinions of the resistance of Bluetooth devices against random attacks
between males and females at the 5% level (p-value = 0.007). The average male score is 1.75,
which is less than 2 (the neutral answer), indicating males generally believe they are not
likely to be susceptible to a random Bluetooth attack. The average female score of 2.48
indicates females generally believe they are likely to be susceptible. The vast difference
between the median male score (median = 1.50) and the median female score (median = 3.00)
further supports this difference. There is also some evidence that there is a significant
difference in the opinions of the legitimacy and integrity of the identity of the other Bluetooth
party between males and females at the 5% level (p-value = 0.025). The average male score
being 2.33, which is greater than 2 (the neutral answer), indicates males generally believe that
the person they are engaging in a Bluetooth transaction with is really who they claim to be
and not an impersonator. On the other hand, the average female score of 1.52 indicates
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females are generally less confident that the person they are engaging in a Bluetooth
transaction with is genuine.
Test 2 - Bluetooth usage
Before an ANOVA test can be run, the condition of each group having approximately equal
sample sizes must be satisfied. Collected data revealed that most respondents use Bluetooth
less than 3 times per month, with very few users in every other group. To remedy this, the
groups "3-10 times", "10-25 times" and "> 25 times" were combined together to form a new
group "> 3 times". The new distribution (Never = 7, <3 = 29, >3=12), while still not
perfectly even in the distribution between groups, is a significant improvement from the
previous.
The initial ANOVA run found that only the confidence in the resistance of Bluetooth devices
against malware had significant differences across groups. Every other question did not show
any significant differences across different groups of Bluetooth usage. As the sample used for
this test is identical to the sample above, the independence assumption has been satisfied.
The Levene's Test significance level of 0.001 indicates significant evidence against the
assumption of equal variances across groups, which is to be expected given the large number
of respondents in the "< 3 times" group compared to the other two groups. Therefore this
assumption is not met.
The Shapiro-Wilk significance levels of 0.001, 0.004 and 0.000 all provide significant
evidence against the assumption of normality, which is also to be expected given the skewed
distribution of opinions for the confidence in the resistance against malware.
Due to the categorical nature of the variables, transformations could not be applied to remedy
the violations of the assumptions. Although the Central Limit Theorem could again be
applied to assume normality, the violation of the homoscedasticity assumption still causes
any results from ANOVA testing to be unreliable, and hence they will not be carried out.
Test 3 - Security knowledge
The initial ANOVA run found that the concern for security when using Bluetooth, the
confidence in the resistance of Bluetooth devices against targeted attacks, and the confidence
of the integrity and legitimacy of the identity of the other Bluetooth party had significant
differences within the groups of people who have knowledge in Bluetooth security and within
the groups of people who have knowledge in computer security in general. Every other
question did not show any significant differences across different groups of Bluetooth usage.
As the sample used for this test is identical to the previous samples, the independence
assumption has been satisfied.
The Levene's Test significance levels indicate that there is no significant difference in the
variance of answers within and between groups for the confidence in the resistance of
Bluetooth devices to targeted attacks (p-value = 0.771) and the confidence in the sender's
identity being who they claim they are (p-value = 0.472). Thus the homoscedasticity
assumption is satisfied for those two variables. However, for the concern for security when
using Bluetooth, there is very strong evidence against the hypothesis of equal variances (pvalue = 0.003), thus violating this assumption.
The Shapiro-Wilk significance levels indicate that there is very strong evidence against the
7

hypothesis of normality for every variable, for both independent variables "studied computer
security" and "studied Bluetooth security" , with the significance levels varying between
0.000 to 0.025. However, due to the large sample size, the Central Limit Theorem can be
relied upon to assume normality.
Upon completing the test for assumptions, both the confidence in the resistance of Bluetooth
devices to targeted attacks and the confidence in the other Bluetooth party's identity as
legitimate satisfy all three assumptions and thus should carry on to the next stage of analysis.
The concern for security when using Bluetooth, however, showed heteroscedasticity and thus
further analysis will not be carried out.
The ANOVA results show that there is a significant difference between those who have some
knowledge in Bluetooth security and those who do not in their confidence in the resistance of
Bluetooth devices to targeted attacks (p-value = 0.073). The respondents who do not have any
knowledge of Bluetooth security are, on average, neutral on the subject (mean = 2; median =
2), while those who do have some knowledge of Bluetooth security believe, on average, that
it would be easy for an attacker targeting a specific Bluetooth device to successfully launch
an attack on it (mean = 2.45; median = 3).
There is also a significant difference between respondents who have some knowledge in
general computer security and those who do not (p-value = 0.007), as well as between those
who have some knowledge in Bluetooth security and those who do not (0.064), in relation to
the confidence that the other party of a Bluetooth transaction is not an impersonator. There is
no evidence of an interaction effect between those two variables (p-value = 0.648), and thus
they can be analyzed separately. For those that have some computer security knowledge, on
average they are more confident that the sender is really who they claim to be and not an
impersonator (Mean = 2.38; Median = 3) compared to those without any computer security
knowledge (Mean = 1.5; Median = 1). For those that have some Bluetooth security
knowledge, on average they are less confident that the sender is not an impersonator (Mean =
1.68) compared to those without any Bluetooth security knowledge (Mean 2.23).

5. Interpretation
The analysis showed some very interesting findings, with a few unexpected revelations. The
respondents are generally not concerned about security when using Bluetooth for file sharing,
which is expected given the modern preference for convenience over security. However, it
was surprising that most respondents felt the need for Bluetooth security to be strengthened
despite not being concerned about it. This would imply that when people use technology they
trust the device to function properly without compromise, believing the security features to be
foolproof. Furthermore it also implies that they believe the developers of any new device will
implement sufficient security to the extent that simply leaving the security to the default
settings will be adequate enough to protect the device from threats, without requiring any
inconvenience from the user to take any extra precautionary measures. Despite the lack of
concern for security when using Bluetooth, when the respondents were questioned about
Bluetooth security many of them believed Bluetooth security to be weak or to have room for
improvement. This opinion is held across all of the security dimensions in the survey,
including malware, encryption, random attacks, targeted attacks, and impersonation attacks.
Despite the belief that Bluetooth security is weak, the lack of concern for security when using
it is justified by the low impact the respondents believe would result from any Bluetooth
attack.
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The difference of opinions between genders shows that females are generally more concerned
about the security of Bluetooth than males when using it. This may be attributable to the
psychology of women being more cautious and pessimistic than that of men (Lewis, Dember,
Schefft, & Radenhausen, 1995; McMillan, Clifton, McGrath, & Gale, 1977; Orenstein,
1994), especially when it comes to using computers and electronic devices (Collis, 1985;
Fetler, 1985; Kiesler, Sproull, & Eccles, 1985; Shashaani, 1997; Shashaani & Khalili, 2001).
For the difference between those with computer security knowledge and those that do not, it
was surprising to find that those with no security knowledge are more skeptical of the identity
of the person they are engaging in a Bluetooth transaction with than those that possess some
computer security knowledge. It is possible that the cause of this is the media scaring the
general public which causes them to be overly cautious when using new technologies. While
for those that have studied computer security, such scares are brushed off as they understand
that the risks of using new technologies are not as extreme as the media conveys them to be.
However, what is more surprising is that those with no Bluetooth security knowledge are less
skeptical of the other party's identity than those that have some knowledge of its security.
Although that by itself is an expected result, when placing it side-by-side with the previous
finding, it implies that there is some characteristic about Bluetooth security that makes it
more vulnerable to impersonation attacks than general computer security which is causing the
reduction in confidence.
It is most surprising that there were few differences in the opinions of those with knowledge
in Bluetooth security and those without it, as Bluetooth security is less stringent than security
found in a PC and thus gives it greater reason for concern. This may be attributable to the
unclear wording of the question asking whether respondents had studied Bluetooth security or
not. Therefore the sample may contain some respondents who have only learnt about general
security; not specific Bluetooth security.

6. Summary, limitations of the findings and future research
In general it has been found that the public are largely neutral about Bluetooth security, not
concerned about security when using Bluetooth; yet see a need for it to be strengthened. Most
of the people interviewed are infrequent Bluetooth users, with the vast majority using it fewer
than 3 times a month. For most of the dimensions of security, the factors of gender, Bluetooth
usage and security knowledge did not affect the public's opinions significantly. In contrast to
this females were shown to be more cautious about the identity of the other Bluetooth party
than males are, as well as being more concerned about becoming the victim of a randomized
Bluetooth attack. Both genders on average believe that it would be easy for an attacker
targeting their Bluetooth device to successfully attack it. Those with Bluetooth security
knowledge are also more cautious when using Bluetooth than those that lack that knowledge,
especially in regards to targeted attacks and impersonation attacks. However, those with
computer security knowledge seemed to be less cautious than those without it in regards to
impersonation attacks, which was surprising as the reverse outcome was expected.
As it was mentioned at the beginning of this text, the data was collected from students of the
School of Business of the University of Auckland. These students are an “informed” group as
all of them must passed several university courses presenting various aspects of computer and
information technology. Results gathered from a random group of people could render
different results and could be completed as the next step in this area of research.
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Another research possibility would be to compare the collected data with the actual security
of Bluetooth: to what extent the public opinions differ from the reality of the current state of
Bluetooth security.
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Appendix: The questionnaire and the answers (in %)
Bluetooth Security Survey
This is a survey to determine now secure university students view Bluetooth transactions to
be. This is an anonymous survey and you will rot be personally indefinable. The results of
this survey are to be used for statistical purposes only.
Please tick the option that you feel best applies to answering the question.
No

Question
Never

<3
times
60

1

How often do you use Bluetooth per month?

2
3
4

Have you ever studied computer/ information security before?
Do you know about Bluetooth's security threats or countermeasures?
Is security a concern to you when You use Bluetooth?

5

Please tick you gender

6

16

Option
3-10
times
16

Male
52

How resistant to you think Bluetooth
devices are against malicious software such
11

Very
weak
8

10-25
times
5
Yes
45
46
35

> 25
times
3
No
55
54
65

Female
48

Weak
33

Neutral Strong
50

6

Very
strong
3

7

8

9

10

as viruses?
In your opinion, hove secure is the data
being transmitted between one Bluetooth
devices to another?

How likely do you think Bluetooth
devices are to being interfered
remotely by someone you DON'T
know?

Almost
impossible
0

Not
likely
33

A bit
Not
confident confident
12
28

11

Based on your knowledge of Bluetooth's
and uses, how large an impact would result
from a Bluetooth attack?

12

Please list every type of device
you know or believe currently
Have Bluetooth capabilities

13

33

Very
Hard
0

How easy do you think it would be for
Bluetooth devices to be tampered with
remotely by someone you DO know?

How confident are you that
the person you are sharing
files with is really who they
claim to be? (Assume you
cannot ask them this in
person)

10

44

Neutral

Likely

27

37

Hard

Neutral

25

29

Neutral

Confident

28

32

Minor
inconvenience
44

Do you think there is a need to strengthen Bluetooth security?

12

13

0

Almost
certain
3

Easy Very
easy
46
0

Very
confident
0

Worrying Devastating
setback
loss
50
6

Yes
81

No
19

